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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Whether an online company given consent by 
users of an online social networking service to access 
data shared or stored by the users on the service, but 
is prohibited access by the service, “intentionally ac-
cesses a computer without authorization . . . and 
thereby obtains information from [a] protected com-
puter” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. 
ii 
 
 
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT 
 
Petitioner Power Ventures, Inc., states that it 
has no parent corporation and that no publicly held 
company owns 10% or more of its stock. 
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Power Ventures, Inc., and Steven Vachani re-
spectfully petition this Court to grant a writ of certi-
orari to review the final decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in this action 
on December 9, 2016. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The Ninth Circuit panel’s opinion is reported 
at 844 F.3d 1058 and is reproduced in Appendix A.  
The opinion of the District Court granting summary 
judgment is reported at 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025 and is 
reproduced in Appendix B.  The opinion of the Dis-
trict Court denying reconsideration is unreported 
and is reproduced in Appendix C. 
JURISDICTION 
The panel (Graber, Wardlaw, Murguia) en-
tered judgment on July 12, 2016.  Petitioners timely 
filed for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.  Re-
hearing was denied on December 9, 2016; the panel 
entered an amended final judgment the same day.  
This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1). 
This civil action is one arising under federal 
law, over which the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367 (sup-
plemental California law claim).  The Ninth Circuit 
had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) provides: 
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“Whoever—intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization or exceeds authorized access 
and thereby obtains—information from any protected 
computer . . . shall be punished as provided in sub-
section (c) of this section.”   
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) defines key terms including: 
 As used in this section –  
(1) the term “computer” means an electronic, magnet-
ic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed da-
ta processing device performing logical, arithme-
tic, or storage functions, and includes any data 
storage facility or communications facility directly 
related to or operating in conjunction with such 
device, but such term does not include an auto-
mated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand 
held calculator, or other similar device 
(2) the term “protected computer” means a comput-
er— 
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution 
or the United States Government, or, in the 
case of a computer not exclusively for such use, 
used by or for a financial institution or the 
United States government and the conduct 
constituting the offense affects that use by or 
for the financial institution or the Government; 
or 
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or for-
eign commerce or communication, including a 
computer located outside the United States 
that is used in a manner that affects interstate 
or foreign commerce or communication of the 
United States 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) provides that:  
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“Any person who suffers damage or loss by 
reason of a violation of this section may maintain a 
civil action against the violator to obtain compensa-
tory damages and injunctive relief or equitable re-
lief.” 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioners are Power Ventures, Inc., and Ste-
ven Vachani, the CEO of Power Ventures, Inc. (col-
lectively “Power”).  From 2006 to 2011, Power oper-
ated an online communications, personal data man-
agement, and social networking aggregator hosted at 
the website www.power.com.  Power offered regis-
tered users the capacity to access multiple online so-
cial networks (e.g., LinkedIn, Twitter), messaging 
services (e.g., Microsoft messenger—MSN), and 
email accounts (e.g., Google mail) through a single, 
integrated online interface consisting of a digital 
dashboard and browser.  This online interface also 
featured popular add-in applications like a unified 
address book and mailbox integrating all of a user’s 
contacts, emails, social network messages, and in-
stant messages in one place.  The interface addition-
ally enabled Power users to move files between dif-
ferent accounts with a click-and-drag function, like a 
user moves folders on an Apple Computer desktop or 
in Microsoft Windows.  Power attracted more than 
ten million dollars of investment as a startup from 
noted Silicon Valley venture capital firms like 
Draper Fisher Jurvetson (who also invested in Hot-
mail, Skype, and Tesla) and registered more than 
twenty million users at its peak.  
One key feature Power offered was the ability 
to transfer document files, address book contacts, in-
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stant messages, emails, and photos easily from one 
online service to another.  Because it is so time-
consuming for people to move countless bits of data 
manually from one service provider to a competitor, 
online companies like Power that facilitate moving a 
user’s data when one provider’s terms of use are too 
onerous are indispensable to lives lived increasingly 
on line.  The right of a user to readily move, copy, 
and transmit his or her own personal data between 
online service providers and storage devices is called 
“data portability.”  Data portability is a burgeoning 
policy concern of our time, as underscored by a re-
cent report issued by the European Commission’s Di-
rectorate General Justice and Consumers.  (See Arti-
cle 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on 
the Right to Data Portability (Dec. 13, 2016), availa-
ble at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/im
age/document/2016-51/wp242_en_40852.pdf).1 
Respondent Facebook, Inc., is a publicly listed 
Delaware corporation founded in 2004 and presently 
headquartered in California.  Facebook operates the 
now-ubiquitous social networking website 
www.facebook.com.  Facebook activates accounts for 
its users (now numbering nearly two billion world-
wide) who register with a unique username and 
password and agree online to “terms of use.”  Face-
book users send “friend” requests to other friends 
                                            
1
 Data portability may be seen as the modern digital analogue of the 
old freedom to dispose freely of one’s possessions, papers, and ef-
fects, protected from government intrusion by the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
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with Facebook accounts and post photos, observa-
tions, status and event updates, and links to inter-
esting websites and articles for their Facebook 
friends.  Each Facebook user may set the audience to 
which he or she wishes to post or share data like pic-
tures and updates (e.g., friends only, the public at 
large), and also the types of friends’ updates for 
which they would like to receive notifications. 
In November 2008, Power, which then had 
over five million users, began offering any user who 
had a Facebook account access to it through Power’s 
online portal by entering his or her Facebook 
username and password.  When these were entered, 
the Power user could access the Facebook website 
through Power’s browser, similar to a computer user 
clicking on his or her programs through Microsoft 
Windows.  (Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft Messenger, 
Twitter, and Myspace were already accessible via the 
Power portal in the same way.)  Power users were 
also invited, as part of a launch promotion, to invite 
their own Facebook friends to enroll on Power via 
“event” or “status” updates that caused Facebook-
generated emails to be sent to Facebook friends 
whose notifications filters were set to allow them. 
Facebook objected that Power’s access of its 
service was unauthorized and sent Power a “cease 
and desist” letter on December 1, 2008.  Power re-
sponded that it had the Power users’ consent to ac-
cess data they had stored on Facebook, including 
their friends’ contact information.  Facebook insisted, 
however, that Power join “Facebook Connect,” its 
program for third-party companies or websites to en-
roll for the right to access user profiles and data on 
terms that Facebook dictated (e.g., without an easy 
way to move data).  Facebook also unsuccessfully at-
6 
 
 
tempted to block Power’s IP (internet protocol) ad-
dress.  Settlement negotiations took place during the 
month of December 2008 but ultimately failed, and 
Facebook sued.  Facebook was the only online social 
network provider to take legal action against Power.  
Google, Twitter, Myspace, LinkedIn, Microsoft, and 
others allowed their users who had Power accounts 
to access and freely move their personal data among 
their respective services via Power. 
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On December 30, 2008, Facebook filed a civil 
action against Petitioners in the federal district court 
for the Northern District of California.  Facebook’s 
complaint, which was amended on January 13, 2009, 
pled claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1986 (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), as 
well as the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-
SPAM”) and California Penal Code Section 502, 
among others.  The statutory provision at issue in 
this case, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), authorizes crim-
inal and civil liability against “[w]hoever intentional-
ly accesses a computer without authorization or ex-
ceeds authorized access and thereby obtains infor-
mation from any protected computer.”  The district 
court granted summary judgment in Facebook’s fa-
vor on the CFAA, CAN-SPAM and California Penal 
Code claims.  App. 25a.  It awarded statutory dam-
ages of $3,031,350 under CAN-SPAM, permanent in-
junctive relief, and held Vachani personally liable for 
Power’s conduct.  App. 109a. 
Petitioners appealed.  In a judgment originally 
filed July 12, 2016, and amended on December 9, 
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2016, the Ninth Circuit panel (Graber, Wardlaw, 
Murguia) reversed the district court on CAN-SPAM 
and invalidated the damages award (holding that the 
relevant invitation messages were not misleading).  
App. 13a, 23a.  The appellate court affirmed the dis-
trict court’s ruling on Petitioner Vachani’s personal 
liability.  App. 22a.  Respondent Facebook did not 
seek rehearing on the CAN-SPAM reversal, and Pe-
titioners do not challenge the panel’s affirmance of 
personal liability before this Court. 
The Ninth Circuit also reversed in part and af-
firmed in part on the CFAA and California Penal 
Code claims, and, accordingly, remanded for consid-
eration of appropriate remedies on those claims.  
App. 23a.  The court held that Petitioners had only 
violated the CFAA (and state law) after Power re-
ceived the cease-and-desist letter on December 1, 
2008 and did not end its marketing campaign via Fa-
cebook users.  App. 23a-24a.  The court reasoned that 
because the Power users with Facebook accounts had 
consented to allow Power to access their Facebook 
contacts, “it did not initially access Facebook’s com-
puters ‘without authorization’ within the meaning of 
the CFAA.” App. 17a.  The court asserted, however, 
that liability under the statute changed after Face-
book sent the cease-and-desist letter, regardless of 
the users’ consent that it had held to have constitut-
ed “authorization” under the statute before the let-
ter.  App. 17a.  “The consent that Power had received 
from Facebook users was not sufficient to grant con-
tinuing authorization to access Facebook’s computers 
after Facebook’s express revocation of permission.”  
App. 19a.  The court accordingly held that “after re-
ceiving written notification from Facebook on De-
cember 1, 2008, Power accessed Facebook’s comput-
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ers ‘without authorization’ within the meaning of the 
CFAA and is liable under that statute.”  App. 20a.  
Petitioners filed for panel rehearing and re-
hearing en banc, which was denied on December 9, 
2016; the panel issued an amended judgment the 
same day.  App. 1a.  Hence this Petition, which seeks 
this Court’s review of the question of CFAA interpre-
tation only. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
Petitioners respectfully submit that the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) is 
clearly erroneous and unprecedented.  It is unrea-
sonable to conclude as the lower court did that users’ 
consent for Power to access their Facebook data (i.e., 
friends’ photos and contact information) constitutes 
“authorization” under the CFAA at one point but 
does not at another.  What led the court below to this 
errant conclusion was the belief that Power was ac-
cessing “Facebook’s computers” when it reached out 
to the Facebook friends of Power users with the us-
ers’ consent and invited them to join Power.  But Fa-
cebook is not a “protected computer” as the term is 
defined and used in the 1986 statute: rather, it is a 
very modern online social network service provider 
that encourages nearly two billion users worldwide 
to join it and share personal data with friends and 
family.  In this context, the “authorization” the 
CFAA refers to is plainly that of the data owners and 
users.  If Facebook wanted Power to stop accessing 
this data, it could have asked the Power users who 
owned the data to withdraw the consent they had 
given to Power, or else cancel the users’ accounts. 
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The Ninth Circuit panel’s interpretation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) to ground a private cause of 
action for an online social network like Facebook as 
against another online company accessing user data 
with the user’s consent is not only unreasonable, it is 
unprecedented.  Facebook, the party asserting a pri-
vate right of action under the statute, has no author-
ship or ownership of the information accessed.  In-
deed, Facebook’s very business model is to entice 
people—“users”—to share personal information 
about themselves on its website.  This is in stark 
contrast to prior CFAA private claimants—typically 
employers or former employers whose computers and 
databases were hacked for sensitive information.  
Facebook is not a bank whose account manager pil-
fered its client-account database to make fraudulent 
charges, see United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 
(CA5 2010), or a government agency whose records 
(including then President Barack Obama’s student 
loan records) were surreptitiously searched by a gov-
ernment contractor, see United States v. Teague, 646 
F.3d 1119 (CA8 2011).  Rather, Facebook is a digital 
scrapbook that enables users to curate their own 
online personae for friends, family, or even the public 
at large, and the data that Petitioners accessed were 
these very artifacts of the users’ personal lives.  Of 
course, Facebook’s proprietary algorithms and confi-
dential business records are its own information, and 
Facebook could surely seek CFAA liability if Peti-
tioners had accessed that information.  But that is 
not this case. 
The court below’s unreasonable and unprece-
dented interpretation of the CFAA in this case has 
immense implications not only in California—home 
of Silicon Valley, the cradle of modern technological 
innovation—but also across the nation.  Hundreds of 
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millions (billions, worldwide) of people use Facebook 
and other social networking and “cloud” storage ser-
vice providers like LinkedIn, Twitter, Google Docs, 
Skype, Dropbox, and Microsoft OneDrive to connect 
with friends and business associates; to store and 
share cherished photos, stories, and documents; and 
to post their observations on life’s big and small 
questions.  Facebook and other data controllers al-
ready have outsized influence over individual users 
as gatekeepers.  Judicial decisions like the one below 
will aggrandize their power even more by handing 
them veto power over online entrepreneurs like Peti-
tioners who seek to enable data portability for users.   
Additionally, the lower court’s interpretation 
is acutely pernicious because 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2)(C) also grounds criminal liability under 
the CFAA of up to five years, ibid. § 1030(c)(2)(B).  If 
Congress today decides that Petitioners’ actions war-
rant such drastic criminal and civil liability, it can 
enact a new statute; the Ninth Circuit’s creation of 
such liability by judicial fiat in overreading a 1986 
statute is not the right way. 
This Court has previously granted certiorari 
when a lower court erroneously interpreted a federal 
statute on an important national issue, even in the 
absence of a circuit split. See, e.g., Owasso Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002); cf. Sup. 
Ct. R. 10(c) (“an important question of federal law 
that has not been, but should be, settled by this 
Court”).  Owasso is particularly instructive because 
the Court granted and reversed the lower court’s in-
terpretation of a federal statute that it later held in 
the same Term did not even afford a private right of 
action.  See Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 
(2002).   
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With special regard to this case, the over-
whelming presence of technology companies in Cali-
fornia and Washington makes it highly unlikely that 
a split among the circuits on this precise issue will 
ripen.2  Ninth Circuit precedents are often de facto 
the law of the land on cutting-edge social media is-
sues owing to the circuit’s hegemony over Silicon 
Valley.    
Alternatively, if this Court were not inclined 
to grant this Petition as presenting a question of na-
tional importance on which it should rule, the Court 
could hold the Petition over and consolidate it with 
the soon-to-be pending petition in another Ninth Cir-
cuit case, Nosal v. United States (“Nosal II”), 844 
F.3d 1024 (CA9 2016),3 for which an extension was 
filed and granted by this Court until April 7, 2017 
(No. 16A840).  Cf. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4).  Nosal II is a 
criminal case involving a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(4), a liability provision of the CFAA with the 
same “without authorization” language as § 
1030(a)(2)(C).  It applies to any person who “know-
ingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected 
                                            
2
 In addition to Facebook, many of the most popular online social 
media providers like YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter, are based in 
California.  Some of the largest cloud service providers are also in the 
Ninth Circuit’s geographic jurisdiction: Apple, Dropbox, and Google 
Drive have headquarters in California, and Microsoft and Amazon are 
based in Washington state. 
3
 An earlier case involved some of Nosal’s colleagues at Korn/Ferry 
who downloaded confidential information from their employer in 
violation of company policies before jumping ship with Nosal to 
launch a competitive firm.  See United States v. Nosal (“Nosal I”), 676 
F. 3d. 854 (CA9 2012) (en banc).  
12 
 
 
computer without authorization … and by means of 
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains 
anything of value.”  Ibid. § 1030(a)(4).  Nosal, the de-
fendant, accessed the confidential database of a for-
mer employer (the executive recruitment firm 
Korn/Ferry) by using the password of his former ex-
ecutive assistant who stayed on at Korn/Ferry at his 
request.  The jury convicted Nosal of conspiracy to 
violate the “without authorization” provision of the 
CFAA under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
Nosal II and this case present the same issue 
of whether a third party (here, Petitioners; there, 
Nosal) who is denied authorization to access data 
(here, friends’ contact information on Facebook; 
there, Korn/Ferry’s confidential database) may do so 
with the consent of an authorized user (here, Power 
users with Facebook accounts; there, Nosal’s ex-
executive assistant).  As the dissenting judge pointed 
out, because Nosal II involved a person (the assis-
tant) who had authorization as a continuing 
Korn/Ferry employee to access its database but not 
for the “use” of enabling Nosal’s conspiracy, it could 
be framed as implicating a 5-3 split among the cir-
cuits over whether “without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access” in the CFAA covers an impermis-
sible use by an authorized person.  See Nosal II, 844 
F.3d. at 1048, 1048-49 (Reinhardt, dissenting).   
Of course, there are also important differences 
between the Petitioners’ novel case involving an 
online social network and Nosal II, which is a tradi-
tional case involving access to an employer’s or for-
mer employer’s computers or database.  But in light 
of the similarities, the Court could hold over this Pe-
tition, grant the two petitions together and consoli-
date for argument, and issue a decision that will be 
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highly instructive to lower courts by distinguishing 
between the two factual contexts as it deems appro-
priate.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah 
Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (simultaneously dis-
posing of petitions from CA1 and CA11 regarding the 
application of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), to joinder of plaintiffs in diversi-
ty suits under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20 and 23, respective-
ly).   
In sum, this Court should grant certiorari in 
this case.  The lower court’s interpretation of the 
CFAA to extend liability to Petitioners as against a 
social networking website like Facebook is a question 
of national importance and is clearly erroneous and 
unprecedented. If uncorrected, the lower court’s rul-
ing will affect hundreds of millions of American (and 
a couple billion non-American) users of Facebook and 
other social network and cloud providers. Alterna-
tively, this Court could hold over this petition and 
consolidate with the petition in Nosal II, which im-
plicates a deep split regarding the scope of what 
“without authorization” means in the CFAA.  Re-
gardless of what this Court chooses to do, this case 
presents a flawless vehicle to decide the Question 
Presented.4 
                                            
4
 Indeed, this case may arguably be a better vehicle than Nosal II be-
cause the defendant in that criminal case was also convicted of two 
counts of trade secret theft in violation of the Economic Espionage 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832 (a).  See Nosal II, 844 F.3d., at 1041.   
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I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF A 
FEDERAL STATUTE IMPLICATING A QUESTION 
OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The Ninth Circuit’s unreasonable and unprec-
edented interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) of 
the CFAA to apply to an online social network ser-
vice provider seeking to bar another online company 
acting with users’ consent from accessing user data 
is clearly erroneous and risks mischief on hundreds 
of millions of internet users.  Rule 10(c) of this Court 
explicitly provides that a lower court’s decision of an 
“important question of federal law that has not been, 
but should be, settled by this Court” is a factor to be 
considered in granting certiorari.  And, as elaborated 
below, this Court sometimes acts to correct a clearly 
erroneous interpretation of an important statute by a 
lower court, even in the absence of a circuit split, to 
prevent ripple effects or dire national consequences. 
The CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, was initially en-
acted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984.  See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 
(1984).  The 1984 statute was substantially revised 
in 1986, with minor subsequent revisions.  The 
CFAA has both criminal and civil liability provisions, 
with criminal sentences ranging from twenty years, 
e.g.,18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(B), to one year, e.g., ibid. § 
1030(c)(2).  The statute’s provision for a private right 
of action states that:  “Any person who suffers dam-
age or loss by reason of a violation of this section 
may maintain a civil action against the violator to 
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief 
or equitable relief.”  Ibid. § 1030(g).  Facebook 
brought its CFAA claim against Petitioners pursuant 
to this provision. 
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The specific provision of the CFAA that Face-
book alleged Petitioners had violated was 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2)(C), which provides: “Whoever—
intentionally accesses a computer without authoriza-
tion or exceeds authorized access and thereby ob-
tains—information from any protected computer . . . 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this 
section.”5   
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) defines “computer” to 
include not only “data processing devices” but also 
“any data storage facility or communications facility 
directly related to or operating in conjunction with 
such device.”  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) then defines a 
“protected computer” to mean a “computer”:  
(A)  exclusively for the use of a financial institution or 
the United States Government, or, in the case of a 
computer not exclusively for such use, used by or 
for a financial institution or the United States gov-
ernment and the conduct constituting the offense 
affects that use by or for the financial institution or 
the Government; or 
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce or communication, including a comput-
er located outside the United States that is used in 
a manner that affects interstate or foreign com-
merce or communication of the United States 
                                            
5
 See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Au-
thorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes” 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1586 
(2003). 
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A violation of this provision can result in a 
criminal sentence of up to five years.  Ibid. 
§ 1030(c)(2)(B). 
Thus, Facebook’s CFAA claim, which the 
Ninth Circuit adopted, was that Petitioners had ac-
cessed its website and servers—a “protected comput-
er” under CFAA—and that it did so “without author-
ization” since Facebook had explicitly told them to 
desist.  On Facebook’s view, the authorization of the 
individual users whose Facebook data Petitioners ac-
cessed was irrelevant after Facebook had instructed 
Petitioners to stop: their authorization was no longer 
the “authorization” the CFAA required.  Specifically, 
the court reasoned:  
Because Power had at least arguable permis-
sion to access Facebook’s computers [from 
Power users with Facebook accounts], it did 
not initially access Facebook’s computers 
‘without authorization’ within the meaning of 
the CFAA.  But Facebook expressly rescinded 
that permission when Facebook issued its 
written cease and desist letter to Power on De-
cember 1, 2008.   
App. 17a. 
The lower court’s holding is unprecedented 
and unreasonable.  Whatever confusion there was 
about what constituted “without authorization” 
among the circuits, see infra Part II, no court had 
held until now that the consent of the individual per-
sons who generated, owned, stored, or shared the 
relevant data or information was irrelevant to the 
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“authorization” the statute required.6  To be sure, if 
the controller or custodian of the data were a bank or 
a U.S. government agency, then the argument might 
seem at least superficially plausible.  But in this 
case, Facebook is an online social network provider, 
with which people voluntarily share personal data 
and information precisely to disseminate it, not to 
lock it away in a vault or to submit sensitive infor-
mation to apply for a government job or benefits.  
Nor is Facebook claiming that its own proprietary 
algorithms and business records were the infor-
mation that Petitioners mined.  At the very least, the 
users’ authorization has to matter for something:  
the Ninth Circuit’s decision renders it entirely irrel-
evant after Facebook denied access to Petitioners 
and gives Facebook the unitary veto power that it 
wanted with respect to its competitors like Power. 
The obvious truth is that the court below was 
wrong to conclude the statute is meant to afford a 
private right of action for an online company with 
consent from its users to access their personal infor-
mation shared with another online social networking 
service when the other service tells the company to 
stop.7  In such a case, the company is not “intention-
                                            
6
 Facebook did not argue below that Petitioners exceeded the users’ 
authorization of access to their data.  In other words, there is no dis-
pute that Petitioners acted within the consent provided by users with 
respect to the users’ Facebook accounts.   
7
 The court below analogized Petitioners’ conduct to a person given 
permission to access jewelry in a friend’s safe deposit box who walks 
into the bank with a shotgun to whom the bank refuses entry.  See 
App. 19a.  The analogy is inapt and misleading because Facebook’s 
mission is not to secure the users’ “property” (e.g., photos, friends’ 
Footnote continued 
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ally access[ing] a computer without authorization or 
exceed[ing] authorized access” and “thereby ob-
tain[ing] information—from any protected computer” 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).  It is unsur-
prising that no other circuit court has reached this 
conclusion, not only because it is an unreasonable 
construction of the statutory text, but also because 
this type of issue about the CFAA is likely to rise 
most commonly if not exclusively in California and 
portions of the West Coast within the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction, where almost all U.S. social network 
and cloud computing service providers are headquar-
tered. 
Furthermore, although the lower court repeat-
edly referred to Petitioner’s access to “Facebook’s 
computers,” e.g., App. 5a, 14a, it is debatable wheth-
er Facebook and its servers are a “protected comput-
er” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).  The 
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contact information) in an online vault, but rather to share it with 
friends and family and sometimes the public at large.  Furthermore, 
Power did not wield a figurative gun: its user-authorized entry into 
users’ Facebook data was not even arguably coercive or dangerous, 
as evidenced by the fact that every other online service in Facebook’s 
position (like Google and Microsoft) permitted it.  As Judge Wardlaw 
noted during the oral argument below, physical property analogies 
are often unhelpful in the online context.  Facebook Inc. v. Power Ven-
tures, Inc., et. al, Oral Arg., 40:48-41:22, No. 13-17102 (CA9 Dec. 9, 
2015), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QUai3OmkdA; see also Mark 
Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 521, 523–26 (2003) 
(“[E]ven a moment’s reflection will reveal that the analogy between 
the Internet and a physical place is not particularly strong.”).    
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statute defines a “protected computer” as a computer 
or “data storage facility or communications facility” 
that performs a mission perceived as essential to 
protect against fraud in the 1980s, such as a comput-
er “exclusively for the use of a financial institution or 
the United States Government,” see ibid. §§ 
1030(e)(1), 1030(e)(2)(A).  True, 18 U.S.C. 
§1030(e)(2)(B)’s catchall reference to a computer 
“used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce 
or communication” is broadly worded.  But a social 
networking website that users access, primarily to 
stay in touch with friends and family, is far beyond 
the government mainframes, bank electronic ac-
counts, and electronic trading exchanges that Con-
gress and President Ronald Reagan envisioned when 
they passed the CFAA.  This kind of vital regulation 
of the new economy should be ratified by a new Con-
gress, not a Congress three decades ago that could 
not have even imagined a Facebook or a Google. 
The Court has previously granted certiorari to 
correct a clear error in interpreting a federal statute 
likely to have broad repercussions if uncorrected, 
even in the absence of a circuit split.  For example, in 
Owasso Independent School District No. 1-011 v. 
Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, there was no conflict among the 
circuits regarding the relevant question of statutory 
interpretation.  Nevertheless, the Court unanimously 
reversed the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Federal Educational Records and Privacy Act of 1974 
(“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g), to reach student-on-
student peer grading and reporting of test scores.  
The Court reasoned that this interpretation “would 
impose substantial burdens on teachers across the 
country.”  Ibid. at 435. “Indeed, the logical conse-
quences of respondent’s view are all but unbounded.” 
Ibid. 
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Like the Tenth Circuit’s erroneous decision in 
Owasso implicating educational privacy records, the 
Ninth Circuit’s clearly erroneous decision regarding 
data privacy promises to have substantial adverse 
ripple effects if not corrected. Its interpretation 
“would impose substantial burdens,” not on teachers, 
but rather on internet users “across the country” 
locked into their current social network service or 
cloud storage providers.  Furthermore, internet 
startups like Petitioners would be constrained from 
offering services like data aggregation and relocation 
to enhance user freedom and online diversity.  In-
deed, the Ninth Circuit’s error here is even more 
egregious because a violation of CFAA, unlike 
FERPA, can ground criminal liability of up to five 
years in this case, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B), as well 
as private liability.  As such, there are additional 
rule of lenity concerns for reversing the lower court’s 
decision.  Cf. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 
(CA2 2015) (applying the rule of lenity to construe 
“authorized access” in CFAA narrowly). 
Similarly, in White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 
(2014), the Court granted certiorari and reversed a 
judgment from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit affirming the grant of a habeas petition 
because the Court determined the lower court had 
misinterpreted the federal habeas statute.  Both the 
federal district and appellate courts held that the 
state court’s refusal to issue a “no adverse inference 
from failure to testify” instruction to a jury in a 
death penalty sentencing hearing violated the de-
fendant’s due process rights.  Ibid. at 1701.  This 
Court explained that the federal habeas statute’s 
“unreasonable application” language is only met 
when the state court’s decision is “objectively unrea-
sonable,” ibid. at 1702, which the Court held was not 
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the case.  Although the Sixth Circuit’s application of 
the statute did not create a circuit split, this Court 
nonetheless reversed because the circuit “disregard-
ed the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)—a provision 
of law that some federal judges find too confining, 
but that all federal judges must obey.”  Ibid at 1701. 
The Ninth Circuit’s erroneous decision has 
immense implications for users of online social media 
and cloud storage.  As users create more online data, 
data portability among different service providers 
seeking to keep existing users locked in becomes a 
growing concern.  New European Commission guide-
lines dictate that users must have “the right to 
transmit personal data from one data controller to 
another data controller without hindrance.”  (See Ar-
ticle 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines 
on the Right to Data Portability, at 4 (Dec. 13, 2016) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/im
age/document/2016-51/wp242_en_40852.pdf).  This 
ensures that users “can obtain and reuse, but also [] 
transmit the data they have provided to another ser-
vice provider.”  Ibid.  The Ninth Circuit has created 
civil and criminal liability for a company seeking to 
assist users—with their consent—fully to use, enjoy, 
and move their own data online as they choose. 
By way of an example, consider a person who 
pays a monthly subscription to a hypothetical com-
pany called PhotoBook, an online cloud storage ser-
vice, to organize and access family photos from any 
computer.  Over years of creating and saving photos, 
the user amasses thousands of photos stored in Pho-
toBook.  Then, because of financial need or practical 
considerations, the user wishes to transfer those 
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photos to another service or to a personal computer.  
The user may seek to hire a company such as Pow-
er—a digital mover—to transfer the photos because 
of a lack of time or technological knowhow.  But un-
der the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the CFAA, 
PhotoBook may unilaterally deny the moving service 
access to the user’s photos, even with the user’s ex-
plicit consent.  PhotoBook not only gains a power to 
lock-in its users (subject to increasingly onerous 
terms), it stifles innovation in the internet economy, 
all based on a clever but erroneous spin on a 1986 
statute. 
The importance of the Question Presented is 
underscored by the attention paid to it.  The Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), a prominent in-
ternet rights non-profit organization, filed two ami-
cus briefs at different stages of the district court pro-
ceedings.  In the Ninth Circuit, the EFF again filed 
two amicus briefs.  The latter of which, joined by the 
national American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) 
and the ACLU of Northern California, explained that 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision risks creating liability 
for individual internet users, researchers, and jour-
nalists.  See Amicus Brief of EFF et al., No. 13-
17154, Dkt. 89 (CA9 Aug. 19, 2016), available at 
https://www.eff.org/document/facebook-v-power-
ventures-eff-aclu-amicus-brief.  The case and the Pe-
titioners have been the subject of articles in major 
news organs like NPR, (Aarti Shahani, The Man 
Who Stood Up to Facebook, NPR (Oct. 13, 2016) 
available at https://goo.gl/UAXhVk), Slate, (Jose-
phine Wolff, The Hacking Law That Can’t Hack It, 
Slate.com (Sept. 27, 2016), available at 
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https://goo.gl/iXnxey), and by Professor Orin Kerr,8 
in the Washington Post online, (Orin Kerr, 9th Cir-
cuit: It’s a Federal Crime to Visit a Website After Be-
ing Told Not to Visit It, Washington Post online (July 
12, 2016) available at https://goo.gl/rdc2Cu). 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD ALTERNATIVELY GRANT 
AND CONSOLIDATE WITH THE PENDING 
PETITION IN NOSAL TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO THE 
CIRCUITS IN CONFLICT OVER THE PROPER 
INTERPRETATION OF “WITHOUT 
AUTHORIZATION” IN 18 U.S.C. § 1030(A)(2)(C)  
The meaning of the words “without authoriza-
tion or exceeds authorized access” in 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2)(C) has sparked conflict among the lower 
courts and is ripe for guidance from this Court.9  18 
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) defines “exceed authorized ac-
cess” to mean “to access a computer with authoriza-
tion and to use such access to obtain or alter infor-
mation in the computer that the accesser [sic] is not 
entitled so to obtain or alter.”  
                                            
8
 Professor Kerr, a national expert on computer crime law issues, was 
joint counsel for Petitioners at the court below.  See also Orin S. Kerr, 
Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1143 (2016). 
9
 Last term, in Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016), this 
Court unanimously held that an erroneous jury instruction on 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C)—that the defendant had to have acted “with-
out authorization and exceed authorized access”—did not offend due 
process, since it presented a tougher standard for conviction than the 
correct reading of the statute with a disjunctive “or”.  That decision, 
accordingly, did not address circuit conflict about the meaning of 
“without authorization” and “exceeded authorized access.” 
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Because most CFAA cases arise in the context 
of an employee or ex-employee accessing an employ-
er’s computers or database, this definition would ap-
pear to foreclose civil and criminal liability in cases 
where the employee was entitled to access but did so 
for an unauthorized use.  Three circuits have hewed 
to this narrow definition.  See United States v. Valle, 
807 F.3d 508 (CA2 2015) (New York City policeman 
not criminally liable for accessing criminal database 
for personal reasons); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. v. 
Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (CA4 2012); United States v. 
Nosal (“Nosal I”), 676 F.3d 854 (CA9 2012).  
On the other hand, five circuits have held that 
employees or ex-employees who access computers to 
obtain data they have a right to access, but do so for 
an improper use or do so in violation of the employ-
er’s policies, violate the CFAA.  See EF Cultural 
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (CA1 
2001) (former employee violated CFAA by using 
“scraper” technology to get price data from a former 
employer’s public website); United States v. John, 
597 F.3d 263 (CA5 2010); Int’l Airport Centers, LLC 
v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (CA7 2006); United States v. 
Teague, 646 F.3d 1119 (CA8 2011); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (CA11 2010).  This Court 
has not resolved this 5-3 circuit split between the 
narrow “no liability for improper use” view and broad 
“liability for improper use” views of the CFAA.  
As described in detail above, the soon-to-be 
pending petition for certiorari in Nosal II can be 
framed as implicating this deep split, and, also, the 
same issue as this case when framed at a higher lev-
el of abstraction.  This could be done, for example, by 
tweaking the Question Presented by this Petition to 
read:  “Whether a third party given consent by a user 
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to access data on a ‘protected computer’ acts ‘without 
authorization’ in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.” 
Without speaking to the merits of Nosal II, Pe-
titioners assert that this case independently war-
rants grant of certiorari because it presents a unique 
question of national importance about the applicabil-
ity of the CFAA to online social media companies. 
This question has ramifications for hundreds of mil-
lions, if not billions, of internet users and burgeoning 
concerns about data portability.  In this respect, it 
differs from the traditional CFAA cases in the lower 
courts involving access to an employer’s or former 
employer’s computers or database, which are usually 
fact-bound to the specifics of each case of less univer-
sal concern.   
But if this Court were not inclined to grant 
this Petition, then Petitioners respectfully request 
that it hold the Petition over and consolidate it with 
the soon-to-be pending petition in Nosal II, for which 
an extension was filed and granted by this Court un-
til April 7, 2017.  See Nosal v. U.S., No. 16A840 (Feb. 
24, 2017); Cf. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4).  On prior occasions, 
this Court has done so, to the profit and guidance of 
lower courts conflicted in similar but not identical 
applications of an enigmatic statute.10  For instance, 
                                            
10
 In fact, there is yet another burgeoning split among the lower 
courts regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).  One federal district court 
has held that the new employer of a person who hacks into the com-
puter of a former employer may also be liable under the CFAA.  See 
SBM Site Servs., LLC. V. Garrett, 2012 WL 628619 (D. Colo. 2012).  
Three district courts have held that a new employer under these cir-
cumstances cannot be vicariously liable.  See Calence, LLC v. Dimen-
Footnote continued 
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in Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 
U.S. 546 (2005), this Court issued a single opinion 
construing the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367, with respect to two different factual 
contexts involving the statute’s application to com-
plete diversity and amount-in-controversy require-
ments for class actions (Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23) and 
simple joinder of plaintiffs (Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20).  The 
Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil supplied welcome 
repose to lower courts and lawyers mired for decades 
in confusion about the statute’s meaning.  So, too, in 
the present case, any guidance from this Court on 
the application of the CFAA’s “without authoriza-
tion” language to different factual contexts such as in 
this case and Nosal II would be illuminating and 
welcome. 
III. THIS CASE IS A FLAWLESS VEHICLE FOR 
DECIDING THE QUESTION PRESENTED, 
WHETHER BY GRANTING THIS PETITION OR BY 
CONSOLIDATION.  
The facts relevant to this petition as articulat-
ed by the court below are undisputed and sharply 
frame the crucial question of statutory interpretation 
raised.  Accordingly, the Court will be able to reach 
and decide the Question Presented without the risk 
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sion Data Holdings, 2007 WL 1549495 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Butera & 
Andrews v. IBM Corp., 465 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2006); Doe v. Dart-
mouth-Hitchcock Med.l Ctr., 2001 WL 873063 (D.N.H. 2001). 
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of an intervening disputed fact or procedural default.  
The challenged part of the decision below rests en-
tirely on the Ninth Circuit’s errant interpretation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).  The issue presented here 
was fully briefed and considered by the Court of Ap-
peals in a reasoned opinion, and so this Court has 
the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ views on the sub-
ject.  The Question Presented by this Petition has 
generated national attention and implicates the fu-
ture of data privacy and portability.  It is ripe for a 
decision by this Court.  Given that the lower court’s 
decision on a question of national importance was 
clearly erroneous and unprecedented, this Court 
could summarily grant, reverse, and remand.  But if 
the Court is disinclined to do so, Petitioners stand 
ready to brief and argue the merits of the case before 
the Court at its pleasure.  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.  
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